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Crime, unemployment and labor market programs 








We exploit the exceptional variation in municipality-level unemployment and spending 
on labor market programs in Sweden during the 1990s to identify the impact of 
unemployment and programs on crime. We identify a statistically significant effect of 
unemployment on the incidence of overall crime, burglary, auto-theft and drug 
possession. A calculation suggests that the sharp reduction in unemployment during the 
later 1990s may have reduced burglary and auto-theft with 15 and 20 percent, 
respectively. After addressing several specification issues, we conclude that there is at 
best weak evidence that labor market programs – general ones and those specifically 
targeted to the young – help to reduce crime.  
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1.  Introduction 
Does unemployment and poor labor market opportunities lead to increased crime? This 
paper uses a new panel data set for Swedish municipalities for the period 1996-2000 to 
explore how unemployment affects crime. During this period the overall unemployment 
rate (including those enrolled in labor market programs) decreased from 11.9 to 6.8 
percent, and for those most likely to commit crimes, people under the age of 25, 
unemployment decreased from 21.2 to 8.7 percent. But the decrease in unemployment 
was far from uniform across the country, and our identification strategy is to use the 
large variation in the improvement in labor market conditions across municipalities to 
isolate the relationship between unemployment and crime.  
Many models of crime suggest that the unemployed, and individuals with low 
wages, face strong incentives to commit (property) crimes. Following Becker (1968), 
the economics of crime pictures an amoral individual, who bases his choice of whether 
to become a criminal on a comparison of the returns to legal and illegal activities. Since 
involuntary unemployment can be expected to reduce the return to working in the legal 
sector, there will be a substitution effect that induces people to commit more crime.
1 
The idea that unemployment breeds crime also has a long tradition in e.g. sociology and 
criminology. It is a common view that crime is the outcome of social interactions, and 
that unemployment creates a criminal culture within certain segments of society.  
The empirical evidence on the link between unemployment and crime is not 
clear-cut; for reviews, see Chiricos (1987) on the older literature, and Freeman (1999) 
on the more recent one. Though some studies indicate that crime has a positive 
association with unemployment, there are many studies suggesting that the relationship 
                                                            
1 See e.g. Freeman (1999). There are extended economic models of crime where the link between 
unemployment and criminal activity is less clear-cut. In a model where people can commit crime while 
working, unemployment may have a zero impact, see e.g. Grogger (1998).    2
is weak or nonexistent.
2 However, upon addressing a number of econometric 
complications two recent panel studies report magnitudes that appear to be statistically 
and economically significant. Using U.S. state-level data Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001) report results indicating that a substantial portion of the decline in U.S. property 
crime rates during the 1990s is attributable to the decline in the unemployment rate. 
Using U.S. county-level data Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) show that the 
unemployment rate of non-college educated men is significantly correlated with 
property crimes like auto-theft and burglary.  
We believe that our paper is a useful contribution for the following reasons. 
First, the huge variation in Swedish unemployment during the 1990s provides an ideal 
opportunity to isolate the effect of unemployment on crime. Most studies exploit data 
for countries and periods in which unemployment is fairly stable, or changes steadily 
over time. With such data it is not easy to separate the effect of unemployment from the 
effect of general time trends, and to avoid that omitted variables bias the result. In our 
data, variations in unemployment dwarf the fluctuations in other covariates, which 
mitigates these problems. Moreover, since the variation in Swedish unemployment can 
be traced to macroeconomic
3 events, which are exogenous to the municipality, bias due 
to reverse causation in the crime-unemployment dimension should be a lesser problem.  
Second, since we have detailed information about economic and demographic 
developments in 288 out of Sweden’s 289 municipalities,
4 we can further reduce the 
risk of omitted variable bias. For example, since unemployment is higher for workers 
with low wages, and for individuals with little schooling, a regression that fails to 
                                                            
2 Less than 50 percent of the studies surveyed by Chiricos (1987) find positive, significant effects of 
aggregate unemployment on crime. But Chiricos also notes that the relationship between unemployment 
and property crime is frequently positive and significant.  
3 For a discussion of the Swedish macroeconomic crisis of the 1990s, see Lindbeck (1997).  
4 In our regressions we exclude one of them, Nykvarn, which was formed only in 1999.    3
control for schooling/unskilled wages may easily bias the estimate of the effect of 
unemployment on crime. Below, we include municipality-level measures of educational 
composition among our regressors. Third, since young individuals are responsible for a 
disproportionate share of many crimes the unemployment rate for this group ought to be 
of particular importance for students of crime and unemployment. Yet, recent studies 
have focused on unemployment rates for much broader groups. By contrast we have 
annual data on the number of unemployed, both in the aggregate population of working-
age, as well as for different subgroups, including those aged 18-24.  
Fourth, a large literature explores how labor market programs affect subsequent 
earnings; see e.g. Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2002). We focus on a different 
effect: does placement in labor market programs reduce crime? Such an effect could 
arise for many reasons. Program participation may imply: (i) that there is less time for 
other activities, including crime; (ii) social interactions that prevent the participant from 
adopting the wrong kind of social norms; (iii) a greater ability to earn legal income in 
the labor market. To the best of our knowledge no other study has explored this issue.  
Finally, in view of the social and economic issues at stake, it is surprising that 
there is so little evidence on these issues for countries other than the USA. Of the 63 
studies reviewed by Chiricos (1987) no less than 52 rely on US data, and there is no 
mentioning of studies for other European countries than the UK. We believe that the 
Swedish experience is interesting in its own right, and that it is a worthwhile exercise to 
analyze whether the relationship between unemployment and crime is of a different 
nature in a welfare state, with generous social transfers.
5  
                                                            
5 We are aware of three previous Swedish studies that analyze the link between unemployment and crime: 
le Grand (1986), Schuller (1986) and Edmark (2002). Le Grand uses aggregate time series data and finds 
a negative partial correlation between burglary and the vacancy rate. Schuller uses cross-sectional data for 
Swedish municipalities, and finds no significant correlations between crime and unemployment. Edmark 
(2002) finds that county unemployment is significantly correlated with property crime.    4
Our results indicate that there is a statistically significant correlation between the 
overall unemployment rate and the incidence of overall crime, burglary, auto-theft and 
drug possession. A calculation suggests that the sharp reduction in unemployment 
during the late 1990s may have reduced burglary and auto-theft with 15 and 20 percent, 
respectively. These effects appear to be of such magnitudes so as to warrant the interest 
of policy-makers. We find much weaker evidence that labor market programs reduce 
crime, and there is no evidence that youth unemployment, and labor market programs 
targeted to the young, have an impact on criminal activity. 
The next section describes our data, and presents our empirical methodology. 
Section 3 reports our basic fixed effect regressions on how unemployment and labor 
market programs affect main crime categories. Section 4 addresses specification issues, 
and section 5 turns to the impact of youth unemployment and youth labor market 
programs. A final section sums up, and suggests extensions for future research.  
 
2.  Data and empirical specification 
Our panel data set includes 288 of Sweden’s 289 municipalities, and annual data for the 
1996-2000 period. Beginning in 1996, the official crime statistics collected by The 
National Council for Crime Prevention contain a municipality-level breakdown of the 
total number of crimes reported to the police, as well as a detailed breakdown among 
different crime categories. Though we emphasize property crimes like theft and 
burglary (i.e. crimes for which economic incentives may play a greater role) we also 
report results for violent crimes, like assault and robbery. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for our crime variables (the appendix contains the exact definitions). For all 
crimes we express the annual incidence per 100,000 residents.    5
The crimes that we focus on in the next section are the five broad categories 
shown in the upper part of the table. Clearly, property crimes like theft and auto-theft 
are far more common than violent crime in the form of assault. There is also a huge 
variation in the incidence of crime across municipalities: the overall incidence of crime 
in Upplands Bro in 1996 (24856 crimes per 100,000 residents) is almost twelve times 
larger than that in Ydre (2115 crimes per 100,000 residents). The lower part shows four 
crime categories, for which young offenders are known to be heavily over-represented, 
assault against unfamiliar man, damage crime, robbery and possession of drugs. The 
final column shows the standard deviation that remains after netting out all variation 
due to fixed municipality and time effects. Below, we will analyze whether this residual 
variation can be linked to the residual variation of local unemployment.  
Poor data quality is an important problem for students of crime. The crimes that 
are recorded by the police can be expected to underestimate true criminal activity by a 
relatively large margin. If this under-coverage varies systematically over time there is 
cause for concern. For example, there is evidence that under-coverage has decreased for 
certain crime categories during the second half of the 1990s.
6 Since unemployment 
decreased substantially during the same period there is a risk that there will be a 
downward bias in the crime-unemployment effect computed from the official crime 
statistics. Still, our empirical approach mitigates this problem to a great extent. First, for 
auto theft and burglary (i.e. two of the crimes that we focus on in the next section) the 
extent of underreporting is most probably small, and stable over time.
7 Second, our 
                                                            
6 This evidence largely relies on comparisons between the official crime statistics and victimization data 
from household crime surveys. National Council for Crime Prevention (2001) includes detailed 
discussions of the development of under-coverage for main crime categories. Domestic violence against 
children and sexual harassment are examples of crime where under-coverage appears to have decreased. 
A crime category for which under-coverage increased during the second half of the 1990s is drunk 
driving. During this period the police shifted to less systematic monitoring practices.. 
7 See e.g. National Council for Crime Prevention (2001). The victims from auto theft and burglary have 
to report the crime to the police if they are to receive compensation from insurance companies.    6
fixed effect specification eliminates the influence of measurement errors that (a) varies 
across municipalities but remain constant over time, and (b) changes in the same 
manner over time in all municipalities. Hence, our results will not be biased by changes 
in under-coverage that are common to all municipalities. Trends in under-coverage that 
are specific to the municipality may still bias our crime-unemployment effects, but only 
in so far as they are correlated with municipality-level trends in unemployment.
8  
The starting point for our investigation is the following model: 
 
Crimeit = ai + lt + qUnemploymentit + gProgramit + bXit + eit.  (1) 
 
Here, i and t are indices for municipality and time, Crimeit is the log of the 
number of crimes of a particular category per 100,000 residents, Xit is a vector of 
demographic and economic controls, i a is a municipality fixed effect and  t l  is a year 
fixed effect. These fixed effects eliminate all variation in crime rates caused by factors 
varying across municipalities but constant over time, and vice versa. Finally, 
Unemploymentit and Programit are our measures of unemployment and placement in 
labor market programs discussed below. Since the time dummies in our benchmark 
specification removes all national trends, we identify the impact of unemployment and 
program participation on crime via the within-municipality deviations from the 
aggregate trends. Our standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent 
with respect to serial correlation within the municipality.
9 
                                                            
8 We are however not aware of any evidence suggesting that municipality-level trends dominate the 
national trends in under-coverage in Swedish crime data.  
9 We estimate (1) using the AREG command in Stata, and invoke the cluster-routine, treating each 
municipality as an independent cluster. The Monte Carlo analysis of Kézdi (2002) shows that the finite-
sample bias of the robust estimators is smaller than the bias of the estimators that assume no serial 
correlation at any sample size. These simulations also reveal that the cluster estimator is unbiased in 
samples of usual size, and slightly biased downward if the cross-sectional sample is very small. In all, 
Table 3 below reports ten estimated semi-elasticities linking unemployment and various crimes; with our 
cluster-estimator, only three of these are statistically significant at the five-percent level. With the   7
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables. For each 
municipality The National Labor Market Board provided us with (annual) information 
about the number of unemployed and the number of individuals enrolled in labor market 
programs, in the aggregate and for different demographic groups. Statistics Sweden 
provided us with complete municipality-level age distributions. We constructed our 
unemployment rates by adding the number of unemployed and the number of 
individuals in programs, and dividing the total by the size of the relevant demographic 
group.
10 To construct a measure of the incidence of programs we divided the number of 
individuals in programs with the sum of individuals classified as being unemployed or 
in programs. There is clearly considerable variation across municipalities in 
unemployment and placement in labor market programs, in particular for the younger 
cohorts. Average unemployment (across all municipalities and for our full time period 
1996-2000) for those aged 18-24 is 15 percent, but the standard deviation is huge, and 
the min- and max values vary between 1 and 44.7 percent. On average 44.4 percent of 
unemployed aged 18-24 are placed in a labor market program, and the min- and max 
values vary between 8.8 and 70.5 percent. 
Our remaining regressors include a range of economic and socioeconomic 
indicators. Some were included because they have been identified as significant 
determinants of crime, others because we judged it important to reduce the risk of 
omitted-variables bias by including as much information as possible about time-varying 
municipality-level heterogeneity. We include the age distribution of each municipality 
to account for the overrepresentation of the young in all crime statistics. For the same 
reason we also include the proportion of males and the proportion of residents not born 
                                                                                                                                                                          
standard fixed effect estimator all standard errors are some 30 percent smaller; as a consequence two 
semi-elasticities would be significant at the one percent-level, and three more at the five-percent level.   8
in Sweden. Some studies indicate that low wages/low education have an effect on crime 
that operates in addition to unemployment, and for this reason we include municipality-
level measures of schooling composition. The preceding literature has suggested several 
reasons
11 why per capita income might matter for the incidence of crime, and since 
average income can be expected to be correlated with unemployment in the same 
location, we include average income among our regressors.  
We do not include measures of detection risk and punishments among our 
regressors. Though this omission may bias our estimates of the crime-unemployment 
effect,
12 we believe that the bias is bound to be small. First, since it is likely that 
criminals’ perceptions of detection risks and penalties change only gradually over time, 
and since our panel spans only five years, our fixed municipality effects should pick up 
most of the action from omitted deterrence variables. Second, since Swedish police 
resources are allocated to police authorities at the county level (a county consists of 5-
15 municipalities), most of the differences in police resources between municipalities 
ought to follow county rather than municipality borders. To check this, we added county 
dummies to all our regressions; it turned out that these were typically statistically 
insignificant, and of no consequence for the coefficients of primary interest. Third, our 
yearly time dummies eliminate the contaminating influence from changes in deterrence 
variables that are common to all municipalities. Finally, in section 4 we use an 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 Unemployment rates are normally computed by dividing unemployment with the labor force rather 
than total population. However, there is no municipality-level data on labor force participation.  
11 In areas with high incomes there can be expected to be a greater supply of theft-worthy goods, which 
should induce more property crime. Alternatively, more prosperous areas can be expected to devote larger 
resources to crime preventing activities, which should reduce property crime. Also, since the income 
elasticity of alcohol consumption can be expected to be positive, and since alcohol consumption has been 
shown to induce (violent) crime, including a measure of per capita income is a way of controlling for 
unobservable alcohol consumption. See e.g. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould, Weinberg and 
Mustard (2002). 
12 For further discussion, see e.g. Levitt (1997), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and 
Mustard (2002), and Machin and Meghir (2000).    9
instrumental variables technique that (among other things) deals with the potential bias 
from omitted variables. 
A comparison of the two final columns of Table 2 shows that most of our 
regressors have little independent variation, once we eliminate all variation due to 
general time trends and municipality fixed effects. For our age, gender and schooling 
variables the residual standard deviations fall in the interval .001-.004. For our variables 
of primary interest, unemployment and placement in programs for different age groups, 
the residual standard deviations are typically about ten times as high. Compared to 
previous panel studies of the relationship between crime and unemployment we have 
unusually large independent variation in our labor market variables. For example, 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001, table 1) report that the residual variation of their 
unemployment variable is of the same order of magnitude as the residual variation for 
their other main regressors (black, poor and age structure). Since the standard error of 
the coefficient of a given independent variable decreases with the total sample variation 
of the same variable this suggests that we can obtain comparatively precise estimates of 
the coefficients on our unemployment and program variables.  
Figure 1 plots the change over the five-year period 1996-2000 in burglary per 
100,000 residents against the reduction in overall unemployment across 285 
municipalities. Two patterns stand out. First, there is indeed a huge variation across 
municipalities in the decrease in unemployment. Second, the plot is quite disperse, and 
it is not easy visually to detect a clear association between unemployment and the 
burglary rate. However, a simple OLS-regression shows that the slope coefficient on the 
change in unemployment is positive, and significant at the seven-percent level. In a 
weighted OLS-regression, where we weigh all observations by the size of population, 
the slope coefficient becomes significant at the five-percent level.    10
Our next task is to examine whether these associations survive more careful 
analysis, where we exploit the year-by-year variation in our data and bring in our full set 
of explanatory variables.  
 
3.  Our baseline specification 
Table 3 presents our basic OLS estimates of the coefficients on Unemploymentit and 
Programit in specification (1) for the five crime categories listed in the upper part of 
Table 1. These coefficients have the interpretation of semi-elasticities; they show the 
increase in percent of a given crime created by a one-percentage point increase in the 
rate of unemployment/program. In the first column, where our left-hand side variable is 
the log of the total crime rate, we see that the coefficient on the overall unemployment 
rate for individuals aged 18-64 is small and insignificant.  
Focusing on specific crimes we see large differences across columns. For 
burglary and auto-theft the unemployment rate has huge positive coefficients, but it is 
only in the burglary equation that the coefficient is precisely estimated. In all columns 
the coefficient on our measure of enrollment in labor market programs is close to zero, 
and statistically insignificant. But the measure of labor market programs that we try out 
in Table 3 captures the incidence of program participation among all unemployed 
individuals of working age, and it is possible that programs that are targeted towards 
youth have a more pronounced impact. Also, if there is reverse causation from crime to 
spending on programs there will be an upward bias in OLS estimates of the coefficient 
on the program variable. We return to these issues below.  
  The results reported in the upper part of Table 3 are based on regressions that 
give equal weight to all observations, irrespective of the size of the municipality. 
Henceforth we will follow most previous students of the crime-unemployment link and   11
focus on the results from weighted regressions, which downplay the influence of small 
municipalities. The lower part shows the results when we weigh all observations by the 
area and time specific size of population. In all equations the coefficient on 
unemployment tends to be larger, at the same time that the t-ratios increase. The 
coefficient on the unemployment variable is significant at the five-percent level in the 
equations for burglary and auto-theft, and at the ten-percent level in the equation for all 
crimes. Like previous studies, we find that unemployment has a statistically 
insignificant effect on the main category of violent crime, assault. The program variable 
remains statistically insignificant in all columns, with a coefficient close to zero.  
  The estimated coefficients matter economically. According to our weighted 
fixed effect regressions a one-percentage point drop in unemployment causes 
(everything else held constant) reductions of 1.2 percent in overall crime, 2.8 percent in 
the burglary rate, and 3.9 percent in the auto-theft rate. Since the mean unemployment 
rate decreased with 5.1 percentage points (from 11.9 to 6.8 percent) between 1996-
2000, our coefficients predict a decrease of 6.1 percent for overall crime, 14.5 percent 
for burglary and 19.9 percent for auto-theft. 
 
4.  Alternative specifications 
In this section we analyze whether the significant crime-unemployment relations that 
we identified in the previous section (i.e. those involving all crimes, burglary and auto-
theft) remain as we estimate alternative models.  
A first issue concerns crime-spillovers. We have so far ignored all spatial 
interactions between municipalities. It appears likely, however, that criminal activities 
are correlated across adjacent municipalities – a criminal may choose to live in one 
community while committing crime in a neighboring community. For example, in their   12
study of crime against foreigners in Germany Krueger and Pischke (1997) find strong 
evidence of spatial correlation in anti-foreigner crime rates. A structurally oriented way 
of dealing with spatial spillover effects is to add covariates from neighboring 
municipalities to the estimating equation. Rather than allowing for spatial interactions 
via a transformation of the error term along the lines of e.g. Anselin (1988) – a 
procedure that has less obvious behavioral interpretations – we thus add new regressors 
to the estimating equation.  
For each municipality we have constructed average (population-weighted) 
measures for all explanatory variables in the surrounding county, and then included 
these as additional regressors.
13 The results from these extended regressions are shown 
in Table 4, which should be compared to our benchmark results of Table 3 (bottom 
panel). In the equations for all crimes and burglary the coefficient on municipality 
unemployment changes little as we include county spillovers, and the same holds true 
for the reported standard errors. As a consequence municipality unemployment remains 
a statistically significant determinant of all crimes and burglary. In these equations the 
county unemployment variable is very imprecisely estimated, with t-values of .2 (all 
crimes) and .66 (burglary). In the equation for auto-theft the coefficient on municipality 
unemployment drops from 3.904 to 2.284, and the standard error changes marginally, 
which implies that the t-value drops from 2.05 to 1.21. The estimated coefficient on 
county unemployment is large (5.126), though imprecisely measured. An F-test shows 
that the two unemployment variables in the equation for auto-theft are jointly significant 
at the ten-percent level (p-value = .09).  
                                                            
13 There are 23 counties in Sweden. Since the municipality coincides with the county for the island of 
Gotland, we could not create covariates from neighboring localities for this island. Hence, in Table 4 we 
loose five observations compared to Table 3.    13
  A second important specification issue is the possibility of a correlation between 
the residual in (1) and our unemployment and program variables. Such endogeneity 
problems appear in different guises. First, if there are omitted variables that are 
correlated with our measures of unemployment and program participation our residuals 
will be correlated with Unemployment/Program, and there will be a bias in our 
estimates of the crime-unemployment and crime-program relations. Second, to the 
extent that Unemployment/Program are determined jointly with our crime variables our 
estimates will be contaminated by simultaneity bias. Third, if Unemployment/Program 
are measured with error there will be a bias in the fixed effect regression of (1). In either 
case instrumental variables techniques offer potential remedies. 
Of these potential problems we believe that omitted variable bias is a less 
serious issue. Our fixed effect specification in conjunction with the relatively large 
residual variances of Unemployment and Program suggests that omitted variable bias 
should be a lesser problem. Bias due to simultaneity in the crime-unemployment and 
crime-program dimensions is a potentially greater challenge. In a municipality where 
crime is rising there might be an induced outflow of firms and jobs, which increases 
unemployment. There will then be a causal and positive link from crime to 
unemployment, which will generate an upward bias in our OLS estimate of the 
coefficient on the unemployment variable.
14 Whether there is reverse causation in the 
crime-program dimension depends on the decision rule of the labor market authorities. 
Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) argue that the National Labor Market Board allocates 
resources among regional authorities according to a rule saying that spending increases 
with past unemployment, and with past number of participants in programs. In the next 
                                                            
14 While we acknowledge that this bias is a theoretical possibility, we believe that it is bound to be small 
in practice. As indicated in our introduction, the huge variation in Swedish unemployment during the 
1990s can be traced to macroeconomic shocks that are exogenous to the municipality.    14
stage of the decision process, when regional authorities allocate resources among 
municipalities, there does not appear to be any formalized allocation procedures, and 
concerns about crime might conceivably play a role. To the extent that a local crime 
shock generates increased spending on programs the OLS results reported in previous 
sections suffer from an upward bias; this may explain why we were unable to identify 
the predicted negative coefficient on the program variable.  
Finally, in constructing our unemployment variable we had to invoke a measure 
of the total population of working age rather than a more appealing measure of the labor 
force. Under certain assumptions this measurement error will create a bias towards zero 
in our estimate of the coefficient on our unemployment variable. Since reverse 
causation from crime to unemployment can be expected to create an upward bias in the 
same coefficient, the overall bias can go either way. 
  We adopt an instrumental variables approach to address these issues. We derive 
our instruments for the unemployment variable following Blanchard and Katz (1992); 
i.e. we interact the first and second lags of municipality-level employment composition 
with the national trend in industrial growth to obtain two measures of the change in 
labor demand in different municipalities (see Appendix). In deriving our instruments for 
the program variable we follow Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) in assuming that lagged 
unemployment and lagged placement in labor market programs approximate the 
decision rule of labor market authorities. This gives us four instruments for our two 
labor market variables. In the first stage regressions of our unemployment and program 
variables on our instruments (and our other controls, including the fixed municipality 
and time effects), the latter are jointly statistically significant at the .0000 level.
15 
                                                            
15 A test for the joint significance of our four instruments in the first stage unemployment regression 
produces an F-statistic of 151.11 (p-value = .0000). In the first stage program regression the F-statistic is 
12.05 (p-value = .0000). Below we also report results when we only instrument the unemployment   15
Table 5 presents our 2SLS estimates of the coefficients on the unemployment 
and program variables, along with the OLS estimates. The TSLS coefficients on the 
unemployment variable are generally larger than the OLS counterparts; in the equations 
for all crimes and burglary the TSLS coefficients are some 42-45 percent larger. We 
view this as evidence that our OLS estimates of the previous section do not exaggerate 
the impact of unemployment on crime. We obtained further support for this conclusion 
in TSLS regressions where we dropped lagged unemployment and lagged placement 
from the instrument set; in these specifications the TSLS estimates were more than three 
times as large as the OLS estimates. Finally, it should be noted that the TSLS standard 
errors are 60-100 percent larger than the OLS standard errors.  
The coefficients on our program variable change in the direction that we 
anticipated from our discussion of reverse causation in the crime-program dimension. 
Unlike the OLS estimates, all TSLS estimates have the predicted negative sign. 
According to the results in the fourth and sixth columns a ten-percentage point increase 
in the share of unemployed who are placed in a program (an increase from e.g. .3 to .4) 
lowers the burglary rate with 4.4 percent, and the auto-theft rate with 8.8 percent. These 
magnitudes appear to matter economically. However, because the correlation between 
the instruments and our program variable is far from perfect, the TSLS standard errors 
are about five times as large as the OLS standard errors. Indeed, they are so large that 
the 95% confidence intervals contain the OLS estimates of the program coefficient. We 
are left with the conclusion that we have only weak, or at best mixed, evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
variable. In this regression we only use our labor demand shifters as instruments (i.e. we drop lagged 
unemployment and lagged program placement from the instrument set); the F-statistic for the joint 
significance of the two labor demand shifters in the first stage regression is 17.8 (p-value .0000). In 
assessing the credibility of our TSLS results it is important to test our overidentifying restrictions (we 
have more instruments than endogenous variables). We have regressed the TSLS residuals on all our 
exogenous variables, and tested for the joint statistical significance of our instrument set. In all these 
regressions, we failed to reject the null that our instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.    16
placement in programs reduces crime. Next we will analyze whether there is a stronger 
association between crime and programs targeted towards young individuals. 
 
5.  Youthful crimes and youth unemployment 
Young people commit a disproportionate share of many crimes. According to Swedish 
statistics on suspected criminals in the year 2000, individuals aged 18-24 were over-
represented as suspects for the following crime categories: assault against unfamiliar 
man 42 percent, robbery 37 percent, auto-theft and drug possession 32 percent, burglary 
31 percent and damage crime 29 percent.
16 If we broaden the age category to 15-24, the 
percentages increase to 69 percent (robbery), 60 percent (assault against unfamiliar 
man), 57 percent (auto-theft), 51 percent (damage crime), 49 percent (burglary) and 37 
percent (drug possession). Some studies suggest that labor market outcomes are of 
particular importance for the criminal activities of young people. Grogger (1998) reports 
estimates – based on longitudinal survey data for the U.S. – suggesting that falling real 
wages may have been an important determinant of rising youth crime during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Lochner and Moretti (2001) use a mix of individual and aggregate data, and 
show that high school graduation significantly reduces crime. They argue that this result 
to a large extent reflects the fact that education increases earnings, which increases the 
opportunity cost of crime.  
This section analyzes whether unemployment among young people, and 
programs targeted towards the same group, have an effect on crime. A first look at the 
issues is provided by Figure 2 that plots the change in the robbery rate against the 
reduction in the overall unemployment rate for those aged 18-24. The scatter plot is 
again quite disperse. The OLS slope coefficient is positive, although only significant at   17
the seven-percent level. Figure 2 also shows the exceptionally diverse development of 
youth unemployment during the late 1990s. Across all municipalities youth 
unemployment decreased with 12.5 percentage points between 1996-2000, but the 
decrease varies between 23.5 percentage points in the municipality of Överkalix and 1.8 
percentage points in the municipality of Bengtsfors . 
  Table 6 presents our basic fixed effect regressions for the six crime categories 
where young are the most over-represented in the official crime statistics. As before, our 
left-hand side variable is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents, we include our 
full set of time-varying explanatory variables and fixed time and municipality effects, 
and we weigh all observations by the area and time specific size of population. Also, we 
use four variables to characterize labor market outcomes, unemployment among those 
aged 18-24 and 25-64, respectively, and program placement in the same groups.
17  
Overall, we find only weak evidence that unemployment among those aged 18-
24 has an independent impact on crime. As we should expect from the results of the 
previous section, unemployment for those aged 25-64 appears with positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in the equations for auto-theft and burglary. We also 
identify a significant positive coefficient in the equation for drug possession. These 
effects remain as we estimate alternative models that instruments our labor market 
variables along the lines discussed in the previous section. But we estimate the 
coefficients on the youth unemployment rate with much lower precision. In the equation 
for assault on unfamiliar man (this violent crime category includes various forms of 
street violence, where young men are heavily over-represented both among victims and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Source: the web page of The National Council for Crime Prevention.  
17 In constructing these variables we weighted the unemployment and program participation rates for the 
different age groups by their shares of the overall population aged 18-64. For this reason the coefficients 
in Table 6 are not directly comparable to the semi-elasticities reported in previous tables. To achieve 
comparability the coefficients in Table 6 must be multiplied by the average population shares, which are 
0.13 (age group 18-24) and 0.87 (age group 25-64).    18
perpetrators) we estimate a negative
18, and marginally significant, coefficient on 
unemployment for those aged 18-24. The other borderline case is in the robbery 
equation, where the coefficient on the youth unemployment variable is positive and 
economically significant,
19 with a p-value of .12. But in our instrumental variables 
regressions both coefficients change sign, and the t-values drop to 0.60 and 0.67.  
With one exception the coefficients on program participation for those aged 18-
24 are estimated with the predicted negative sign. But the point estimates are 
numerically small, with t-ratios at, or below, unity. Transforming the coefficients into 
semi-elasticities (see footnote 17), the latter lie in an interval between -0.39 (robbery) 
and 0.02 (damage crime). In our instrumental variables regressions, where we model the 
decision rule of the labor market authorities in the manner of the previous section, all 
standard errors increase substantially, while the point estimates either stay about the 
same, or change sign from negative to positive.  
A final unresolved issue derives from the fact that some youth crimes have an 
incidence of zero in many municipalities. Because of our logarithmic transformation 
these observations become missing values in Table 6. This implies that we lose close to 
20 percent of the observations in the equation for robbery, and 4 percent of the 
observations for drug possession. To see whether this censoring matters for our results 
we estimate two alternative models. First, since the incidence of crimes per 100,000 
residents is measured on a scale that only takes on non-negative integer values, our left-
hand side variable is a count variable. Because of this we estimate a Poisson regression 
                                                            
18 Both Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) report that state- 
and county-level unemployment have a negative impact on some categories of violent crime in the U.S. 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer report evidence that this is due to a lower frequency of interactions between 
victims and perpetrators when unemployment is high.  
19 Multiplying the coefficient of 16.1 with a population share of 0.13 (see footnote 17) produces a semi-
elasticity of 2.1, which is of a magnitude that matters economically. It implies that a one-percentage point 
increase in unemployment among males aged 18-24 increases the robbery rate with 2.1 percent. Since the   19
model, using our full sample. Second, we simply re-code all zeros to ones, before 
introducing the logarithmic transformation of our left-hand side variable, and then 
estimating our baseline fixed effect model. In either case, we are left with a full sample 
of 1437 observations. The results are shown in Table 7.
20 It does not appear that 
censoring is an important issue. Comparing with the results for robbery and drug 
possession in Table 6, the order of magnitude of the coefficients remains the same. 
Also, in both tables it is only in the equation for drug possession that we identify a 
statistically significant coefficient, the one on unemployment for those aged 25-64.  
  Summing up, we find no strong evidence that youth unemployment, and labor 
market programs targeted to the young, have an impact on those crimes where young 
offenders are known to constitute a large share of the total. In view of our robust 
evidence that general unemployment has an impact on some broad crime categories we 
find these results puzzling. Possible explanations could be as follows. First, the weak 
association between youth unemployment and youthful crimes could reflect that many 
of those involved in criminal activity in the youngest age cohorts still attend school. 
Second, the absence of a clear association between youth programs and youth crime 
could reflect that youth involved in criminal activity manage to opt out of the programs; 
i.e. there is a selection of non-criminal youth into programs.  
  A final observation is that prime-aged unemployment, measured by 
unemployment for those aged 25-64, is robustly correlated with several youthful crimes, 
including drug possession. This finding is consistent with the idea, often expressed in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
unemployment rate of those aged 18-24 decreased with 12.5 percentage points between 1996-2000, our 
estimate predicts a decrease in the robbery rate with 26.3 percent over the same period.  
20 It should be noted that because of the logarithmic transformation used in the baseline model, the 
estimated coefficients in the Poisson model are comparable to those presented in Table 6.We do not 
report the standard errors in our Poisson regressions. These standard errors are defined by the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable, which is a poor assumption.    20
the sociological mobility literature, that unstable life conditions of parents can be 
expected to have adverse spillover effects on the choices of their children.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
A main advantage of our study is that we have access to a data set – gathered from a 
period with extraordinary shocks to local unemployment – that substantially reduces the 
risk that omitted variables and reverse causation lead to biased estimates of the crime-
unemployment relationship. During the time period under investigation the changes in 
local unemployment were much larger than the changes in other plausible determinants 
of crime, and the origin of these shocks to unemployment can be traced to 
macroeconomic events, external to the municipality.  
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, even in a welfare state 
where social insurance cushions a substantial part of the income loss from job 
displacement, a shock to general unemployment has a statistically and economically 
significant impact on main categories of property crime. Second, we could not establish 
a clear association between youth unemployment and the incidence of certain youthful 
crimes. Some of these crimes are, however, correlated with prime-aged unemployment, 
a finding that points towards the possible role of parental economic conditions in 
determining youth crime.  
Third, we found little evidence that labor market programs reduce crime. 
Though we found some weak evidence that programs targeted towards the general 
population of unemployed reduce property crime, we found no indications at all that 
programs targeted towards those aged 18-24 have an impact. Our data does not allow us 
to tell whether this non-association reflects a true behavioral response, or whether it 
primarily reflects a selection process, where criminally inclined young individuals are   21
sorted into non-participation. In view of the large sums spent on these programs, it 
seems appropriate to conclude with the customary call for future research.  
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Appendix A. Definitions of variables 
Table A1. Definitions of crime variables 
 
Variables  Definitions 
All crimes  All crimes reported in the municipality during the 
year. 
Burglary  All burglary, not including fire arms. 
Theft  All thefts from vehicles, in public places, restaurants, 
shops, schools etc. Also including shoplifting and 
pickpocketing. 
Auto theft  All car thefts, both attempted and completed. 
Assault  All assaults, not with fatal ending, against children, 
women and men. 
Assault against man, 
unfamiliar with the victim 
Assault against male where the perpetrator is 
unfamiliar with the victim, both outdoors and indoors. 
Damage crime  All damage crime, including graffiti.  
Robbery  All robbery against the person. 
Possession of drugs  Including possession of drugs and own usage. 
Note: All variables are number of crimes reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
Table A2. Definitions of control variables 
Variables  Definitions 
Proportion unemployed aged 
18-64, 18-24 and 25-64. 
Number of unemployed individuals out of total 
population in relevant age-group. 
Proportion unemployed in 
labor market programs, aged 
18-64, 18-24 and 25-64. 
Number of individuals in labor market programs 
out of total number of unemployed individuals in 
relevant age-group. 
Proportion not born in 
Sweden 
Number of individuals not born in Sweden out of 
total population. 
Income per capita (in kronor)  Taxable income per capita. 
Age distribution  Proportion of individuals in different age-groups 
out of total population. 
Proportion of men  Number of men out of total population. 
Proportion with no high-
school degree 
Proportion of the population with at most nine 
years of schooling. 
Proportion with high school 
degree 




 Appendix B. Results for the baseline specification 
Table B1. Results for the control variables corresponding to the results in the lower part of Table 3. 
 
    Property crime  Violent crime 
  All crime  Burglary  Theft  Auto-theft  Assault  
Weighted fixed effects model           
Income per capita (in kronor)  -6e-06**  -3e-06  -7e-06**  -2e-05**  -8e-06*** 
  (3e-06)  (5e-06)  (3e-06)  (8e-06)  (3e-06) 
Proportion not born in Sweden  0.369  -4.067  -1.766  -4.763  3.742 
  (2.123)  (3.400)  (2.910)  (4.424)  (2.516) 
Age distribution:           
   proportion aged 0-15  -1.546  -2.975  1.692  6.714  -4.481 
  (2.855)  (4.880)  (3.578)  (6.825)  (3.941) 
   proportion aged 16-19  -3.475  -7.119  -1.710  10.823  6.558 
  (4.561)  (6.310)  (5.655)  (8.430)  (5.633) 
   proportion aged 20-24  -7.589***  -11.739**  -9.176***  -2.671  -5.335 
  (2.947)  (5.564)  (3.646)  (7.503)  (3.964) 
   proportion aged 25-54  1.929  1.423  2.711  3.838  -2.009 
  (1.362)  (2.196)  (1.736)  (2.930)  (2.075) 
Proportion with no high-school degree  1.859  -0.789  1.736  3.602  -2.555 
  (2.143)  (3.777)  (2.615)  (5.199)  (2.961) 
Proportion with high-school degree  4.548***  5.467**  6.926***  7.282*  -0.453 
  (1.299)  (2.718)  (6.926)  (4.152)  (1.765) 
Proportion of men  -5.256  -9.791  -2.848  -2.330  -3.193 
  (4.808)  (9.192)  (6.108)  (11.864)  (6.963) 
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. In all regressions the dependent variable is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents. In addition to the variables 
shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The 
weighted fixed effects model weighs all observations by the area and time specific size of population. 
 Appendix C. Instruments for municipality-level unemployment 
This section explains the procedure of constructing our municipality-level instruments 
for labor demand. We interact the initial employment in different industries at the 
municipality-level with the national trend in industrial growth to construct measures of 
the change in labor demand in different municipalities.  









where  t j L ,  is number of employed in industry j at time t in the country. 
  Our  first  instrument  for  unemployment  in  municipality  i  will  then  be  these 
national growth rates interacted with the municipality-specific composition of industrial 
employment, lagged one period:  
( ) [ ] ￿ - - + ´ =
j
t j i j t j i i L g L Instrument 1 , , 1 , , 1    
Our second instrument will be the corresponding interaction but with industrial 
composition of employment lagged 2 periods: 
( ) [ ] ￿ - - + ´ =
j
t j i j t j i i L g L Instrument 2 , , 2 , , 2 . 
Our raw data is taken from the RAMS data base of Statistics Sweden. This register-
based data base includes information about all individuals who have their residence in 
Sweden, their work places, and the sectoral affiliation of the work place. In our 
application we construct our instruments for 288 municipalities and five time periods 
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Figure 1. Annualized change in burglary (in %) and percentage
              point change in total unemployment across 285
              municipalities, 1996-2000
Note: The burglary rate is measured as number of reported crimes per 100,000 residents. Our raw 
data includes 285 municipalities for which we have information about the change in crime and 
unemployment between 1996-2000. In constructing the figure we dropped one outlier, the 
municipality of Bengtsfors (for this municipality unemployment actually increased substantially 
between 1996-2000). The regression line comes from an OLS-regression, where the change in 
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Figure 2. Annualized change in robbery (in %) and percentage
             point change in youth unemployment across 204
             municipalities, 1996-2000
 
Note: The robbery rate is measured as number of reported crimes per 100,000 residents. Because of 
the logarithmic transformation of the robbery rate we dropped 82 municipalities with a zero robbery 
rate in constructing the figure. The regression line comes from an OLS-regression, where the change 
in crime is regressed on a constant and the change in unemployment, age 18-24.  
 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics, crime variables 
 




St. dev. net 
of fixed 
effects 
All crimes  2115  24856  8898.4     0    3106.9  1059.8 
Burglary    238   4008  1340.0     0      500.2   281.7 
Theft    635   8108  2721.5     0    1185.4   397.6 
Auto theft        0   1955    449.8     3      298.9   125.7 
Assault      35   1594    446.4     0      193.8     83.1 
Assault on unfamiliar man        0     599    141.3   19        87.4     40.4 
Damage crime    168   5068    995.7     0      396.7   211.4 
Robbery        0     327      28.8  178        38.8     16.0 
Possession of drugs        0   1202    161.4    58      146.7     93.4 
Note: All crime categories are expressed as the annual incidence per 100,000 residents. Our complete panel consists of 1437 observations for 288 
municipalities during the period 1996-2000. We have dropped one municipality, Nykvarn, which was formed in 1999. We have also dropped one outlier 
observation for "All crimes" for  the municipality of Årjäng in 1996. Number of zeros are the number of observatons for which the crime category has 
zero reported crimes per 100,000 residents. Standard deviations net of fixed effects show the standard deviations that remain after  eliminating all 
variation due to fixed municipality effects and common time effects. 
 
    
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, control variables 
 
Variables  Min  Max  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
St. dev. net 
of  fixed 
effects 
Proportion unemployed:           
   aged 18-64  0.014  0.248  0.093  0.036  0.007 
   aged 18-24  0.010  0.447  0.150  0.072  0.017 
   aged 25-64  0.015  0.225  0.084  0.031  0.006 
Proportion unemployed in labor market program:           
   aged 18-64  0.139  0.693  0.374  0.066  0.032 
   aged 18-24  0.088  0.705  0.444  0.091  0.047 
   aged 25-64  0.136  0.693  0.355  0.064  0.034 
Proportion not born in Sweden  0.018  0.376  0.080  0.046  0.003 
Income per capita (in kronor)  71452  210474  99547  13942  1404 
Age distribution:           
   proportion aged 0-15  0.140  0.259  0.203  0.018  0.002 
   proportion aged 16-19  0.029  0.086  0.048  0.004  0.002 
   proportion aged 20-24  0.033  0.120  0.052  0.010  0.002 
   proportion aged 25-54  0.336  0.515  0.407  0.022  0.004 
Proportion of men  0.476  0.527  0.501  0.008  0.001 
Proportion with no high-school degree  0.105  0.431  0.306  0.052  0.004 
Proportion with high-school degree  0.255  0.501  0.407  0.030  0.005 
Note: For all control variables we have 1437 observations, covering 288 municipalities during the period 1996-2000. For further description of data and data 
sources, see text. Standard deviations net of fixed effects show the standard deviations that remain after eliminating all variation due to fixed municipality effects 
and common time effects. 
 
    
 
Table 3. The baseline specification 
 
    Property crime  Violent crime 
  All crime  Burglary  Theft  Auto-theft  Assault  
Basic fixed effects model           
Proportion unemployed aged 18-64  .665  2.469**  0.890  3.264  0.642 
  (.667)  (1.132)  (0 .824)  (2.069)  (1.565) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-64  -0.030  0.069  0.017  -0.368  0.267 
  (0 .139)  (0 .244)  (0 .176)  (0 .399)  (0.280) 
Observations  1436  1437  1437  1434  1437 
Adjusted R-squared  0.884  0.708  0.869  0.822  0.755 
Weighted fixed effects model           
Proportion unemployed aged 18-64  1.221*  2.838**  1.251  3.904**  1.270 
  (0.680)  (1.261)  (0.831)  (1.909)  (1.061) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-64  0.090  0.172  0.110  0.248  -0.033 
  (0.151)  (0.257)  (0.195)  (0.319)  (0.220) 
Observations  1436  1437  1437  1434  1437 
Adjusted R-squared  0.945  0.811  0.943  0.89  0.894 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. They are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent with respect to serial correlation within the municipality. In all regressions 
the dependent variable is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents. We loose one observation in column 1 (because of an apparent error in the coding of the raw data), 
and three observations in column 4 (auto theft) because of the censoring at zero. In addition to the variables shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of 
municipality and year effects, and the time-varying variables shown in Table 2.  ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The weighted fixed 
effects model weighs all observations by the area and time specific size of population. Table 4. Model with county spillover effects 
 
  All crime  Burglary  Auto-theft 
Weighted fixed effects model       
Proportion unemployed aged 18-64  1.198*  2.876**  2.284 
  (0 .673)  (1.227)  (1.885) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-64  0.028  0.182  -0.129 
  (0 .162)  (0 .265)  (0 .369) 
County unemployment  0.331  -1.909  5.126 
  (1.693)  (2.890)  (3.833) 
County participation in labor market programs  0.094  -0.039  1.442 
  (0 .316)  (0 .583)  (0.894) 
Observations  1431  1432  1429 
Adjusted R-squared  0.945  0.815  0.892 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. They are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent with respect to serial 
correlation within the municipality. In all regressions the dependent variable is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents. We 
loose one observation in column 1 (because of an apparent error in the coding of the raw data), and three observations in column 3 
(auto theft) because of the censoring at zero. Moreover, we loose five observations in all columns because the island of Gotland 
has no neighboring municipalities. In addition to the variables shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of 
municipality and year effects, and the time-varying variables shown in Table 2. As described in the text we also include the 
county-level counterparts for all the regressors described in Table 2.  ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. All observations are weighted by the area and time specific size of population.  
 
    
Table 5. Instrumenting unemployment and program participation 
 
  All crime  Burglary  Auto-theft 
  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS  OLS  TSLS 
Proportion unemployed aged 18-64  1.221*  1.750  2.838**  4.033*  3.904**  3.934 
  (0.680)  (1.376)  (1.261)  (2.136)  (1.909)  (3.055) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-64  0.090  -0.434  0.172  -0.437  0.248  -.875 
  (0.151)  (0.739)  (0.257)  (1.146)  (0.319)  (1.821) 
Observations  1436  1411  1437  1412  1434  1409 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. They are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent with respect to serial correlation within the municipality. In all 
regressions the dependent variable is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents. All regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects, and the time-
varying variables shown in Table 2. ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. All observations are weighted by the area and time specific 
size of population. I. For a discussion of the first-stage regressions underlying the results in the TSLS columns, see text. The results of the OLS columns are those 
reported in the lower panel of Table 3.  
    
 
Table 6. The baseline specification: youth crime 
 
















Proportion unemployed aged 18-24  -9.497*  16.100  -6.492  -2.956  -0.729  -4.051 
  (5.300)  (10.370)  (6.155)  (10.795)  (4.329)  (3.812) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-24  -2.314  -3.060  -0.888  -2.214  -0.942  1.535 
  (1.615)  (2.788)  (1.701)  (3.085)  (1.123)  (1.305) 
Proportion unemployed aged 25-64  3.400  -0.372  6.762***  9.703**  3.790**  1.834 
  (2.112)  (3.855)  (2.523)  (4.076)  (0.623)  (1.686) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 25-64  -0.411  -0.010  0.456  0.175  0.351  -0.253 
  (0.391)  (0.814)  (0.408)  (0.766)  (0.313)  (0.309) 
Observations  1418  1159  1434  1379  1437  1437 
Adjusted R-squared  0.855  0.880  0.891  0.777  0.812  0.833 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. They are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent with respect to serial correlation within the municipality. In all regressions the dependent variable 
is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 residents. In addition to the variables shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects, and the time-varying variables 
shown in Table 2. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. All observations are weighted by the area and time specific size of population.  
    
 
Table 7. Robbery and drug possession: dealing with corner solutions 
 














Proportion unemployed aged 18-24  13.927  19.329  -0.344  -1.085 
    (12.859)    (11.220) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 18-24  -5.008  -2.648  -7.035  -2.262 
    (3.899)    (3.262) 
Proportion unemployed aged 25-64  3.322  2.078  5.605  10.149** 
    (4.478)    (4.297) 
Proportion in labor market programs aged 25-64  -0.247  0.137  -0.450  0.142 
    (0.915)    (0.808) 
Observations  1437  1437  1437  1437 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. They are robust to heteroscedasticity and consistent with respect to serial correlation within the 
municipality. In addition to the variables shown in the table, all regressions include a complete set of municipality and year effects, and the time-
varying variables shown in Table 2.  ** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. All observations are weighted by the area 
and time specific size of population. 
 
 
 
 